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NOTE AND COMMENT
Dxcpim OFFEikiN CONVEYANCE op F6OEIN
Review, Prof. Willard Barbour discussed
the question indicated by the above title. His cbnclusions may be-briefly
slated as follows: that such a decree of a competent court having jurisdiction of the person of the defendant creates a personal obligation upon the
defendant which a court of equity at the situs should enforce just as it
w9uld a contract or trust concerning this land made in the foreign jurisdiction: and that, as between the States of this Union. the "full faith and
credit" clause of the Constitution makes such enforcement of the 'foreign
decree obligatory. He conceded that, upon the authorities," these points are
,still open to debate, but he -showed that the tendency of the law, through the
EVVC AT THE SITUS Pxr, OF A
LAN.-In a recent article in this

course of several centuries, has been obviously in the direction of these

conclusions, that the negative authorities are in the nature of a survival in
part of doctrines long since abandoned, and that the distinctions upon which
the survival restsre without logic or good sense. "Extra-territorial Effect
.of the Equitable Decree," 17 MICH. L. Rzv. 527.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa gives aid and comfort
to Mr. Barbour's thesis. In a suit for divorce in the state of Washington, the
court, upon granting divorce, ordered the husband to convey to the wife
his land in Iowa. The defendant evaded the process of the court and, in
Iowa, conveyed the land to one who had notice of the Washington decree.
Upon suit brought in Iowa against the husband and his grantee, the court

NOTE AND. COMMENT
In
set aside the conveyance and ordered the husband to convey to the wife.
both siiits, perso'nal jurisdiction of the husband was obtained, and, in the
for the
Iowa court, of the grantee also. In both states, the statutes provided
allocation of the property of parties to a divorce suit. Matson v. Matson,
173 N. W. 127.
This case clearly proceeds in the main, upon the principles urged by Mr.
Barbour, and is inconsistent with what has usually been regarded as the doctrine of Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N. J.Eq. 561, Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. io4, and
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. x. But, with what may be considered commendable
conservatism, the court avoids criticism of those cases by distinguishing them,
upon points which were given more or less emphasis by those courts, but with
which Mr. Barbour did not concern himself. It thus pronounceb; a doctrine
somewhat more limited than that advanced by the article in this review, and
it seems well worth while to consider the validity of these distinctions and
limitations.
Fall v. Fall and Fall v. Eastin are distinguished in that the husband was
first
not served with process in the second suit. But, if the decree in the
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even though it fails to acquire jurisdiction of the husband. Any other position violates the well settled and highly politic principles of equity concerning
the
notice. Probably no one would question this position so far as concerns
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"full
only to consider the constitutional question, Justice Holmes says that the
of
faith and credit" clau~e does not require any state to apply the doctrines
parties.
notice but only to recognize the effect of judgments upon the immediate
rules
But, without inquiring whether a merely colorable departure from the
of notice should be held an effective evasion of the Constitution, it is clear
that a violation of sound and settled rules of equity is not condoned by showing that it is not also a violation of the Constitution.
A second distinction raises a more serious question. All three of the cases
cited are distinguished in that the statutes of the state where the land lay
did not provide for the division of the property of the parties to a divorce
suit. To this line of distinction two objections lie. In the first place, it violates
the principle that the merits of a foreign judgment or decree, assuming that
the court had jurisdiction, cannot be inquired into. See 17 MIcu. L. Rzv. 545,
to be
546. In the second place, even if the merits of the former decree are
,examined, its merits are not impugned by showing that the courts at the
situs have no power to make a similar decree. It would. seem self evident
dethat the power of a court to impose a personal obligation upon a party
which
principle
same
the
pended solely upon the law of its own state-upon
makes the effect to be given to such obligation in another state depend upon
the law of that other state and the United States Constitution. The question
here seems to be entirely free from the difficulties which surround the ques-
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tion as to what law governs the formation of contracts and trusts of foreign
land.' Thus, as to the fundamental doctrine of the principal case, that the
foreign decree created a personal obligation upon the husband, .it seems
nqt to matter at all whether the local court could have made a similar decree.
Then the .question remains whether the propriety (or duty, under the Constitution) of recognizing and enforcing the obligation of the foreign decree
is affected by the existence or non-existence of power in the local court to
make a similar decree.' The answer, unless we are willing to accept merely
arbitrary distinCtions, is negative. There is no safer generalization in the
field of conflict of laws than this: that all obligations created abroad should
be enforced, regardless of whether similar obligations might have been similarly created under the law of the forum, unless in particular cases where
their ehforcement'is contrary to the policy of the forum. That there is no
policy opposed to the acceptance of such foreign decrees as we are considering, is demonstrated by Mr. Barbour, who calls attention to the fact that
an- such policy would be equally violated by acceptance of a deed executed
under compulsion of the foreign court-which latter form of indirect acceptance of the foreign decree has never been refused. 17 MicH. L. RFv. 549.
It is submitted that the distinctions attempted in the principal case are
untenable, and must go the way of the other "diversities," parcel of the conservative doctrine, which are rejected by the court in reaching its decision.
E. N. D.

